▪García, O. (2024). The testimony thallenge against the possibility of philosophical knowledge. Metaphilosophy 55 (3): 316–327. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12683
▪García, O. (2022). Metaphilosophical implications of deep philosophical disagreements. Cuadernos de filosofia, (40), 117-138. https://doi.org/10.29393/CF40-6IMOG10006 [Spanish]
▪García, O. & Rodrigues, L. (2022). Philosophical disagreement versus philosophical knowledge. Revista Perspectiva Filosófica, 49(2), 244-258. https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.253892
▪García, O. (2022). Aristotle and Aristophanes: Women, Rhetoric and Politics. As Mulheres de Aristófanes: revolução e recepção. Editorial Pimenta Cultural: São Paulo. https://doi.org/10.31560/pimentacultural/2022.718 [Spanish]
▪García, O. (2022). Lycan William. On Evidence in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. 160 pp. Ideas y Valores, 71 (179), 241-246. https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/91078 [Spanish]
▪García, O. (2021). Kirk Lougheed, Kirk Lougheed, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement. Logos and Episteme 12 (4):469-474. https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112437
▪García, O. (2019). Rhetoric and Education: An Interpretative Proposal for Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Educational Innovations, 21(31), 76-88. https://doi.org/10.22458/ie.v21i31.2695 [Spanish]